Authors: Juhana Riekkinen (University Lecturer in Legal Informatics) and Jakob Zanol (Project Assistant, University of Vienna)
Research Group: Law, Technology and Design Thinking
Introduction[i]
1) the initiator(s), that is, the one(s) designating the target(s)
2) the participants, that is, the ones carrying out the attack.
Fig. 1. The concept of maalittaminen and the actors involved.
A “target” is
designated by either simply mentioning the name or contact information of a
person, or by hinting, suggesting or explicitly stating that certain kinds of
messages should be sent to the target. The initiator may disseminate their
message via many forums, and the subsequent “attack” may, likewise, consist of
many types of messages and acts via multiple channels, including social media,
instant messaging, e-mail, physical mail, and even in-person aggression.
It is often highlighted that targeted harassment entails organized cooperation in which a group of people commit a number of (speech) acts that are linked by their purpose. In reality, the level of organization or co-operation between participants may vary or be difficult to prove, as most online communities lack strict organizational hierarchies.
Finnish initiatives to criminalize maalittaminen
Juhana Riekkinen |
Although many forms of cyber-enabled targeted harassment are covered by pre-existing, technology-neutral provisions in the Finnish Criminal Code, there have been calls for creating a new, specific offence to combat maalittaminen and to more effectively punish and deter harassment in the online environment.
For example, in June 2019, the National Police Board, the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the Chief Judges of the District Courts proposed a new criminal offence, which would criminalize actions that cause a situation that is conducive to frustrating the activities or decision-making of a public authority.[iii]
These actions would include harassing or threatening a person in the service of a public authority and expressing or spreading unfounded claims related to them.
The
criminalization would further cover creating such a situation “in another comparable manner”, as
well as “knowingly providing a
platform”[iv]
for any such actions. Despite its wide scope, the proposed provision would not
protect all victims of online harassment (such as journalists or scientists),
but merely shield public authorities and those working for them.
In a
government-commissioned report, Mika
Illman rejected the proposal due to incompatibility with human rights
obligations and the Constitution of Finland.[v] In
particular, he found the proposed provision too imprecise to fulfil the
principle of legality and too restrictive in regard to freedom of expression.
In the same
report, Illman presented an alternative approach, which can be characterized as
a collection of existing criminal law norms in a single provision that
recognizes targeted online harassment as a phenomenon. The proposed section on
“participation in illegal targeted
harassment” would apply to five different types of unlawful activities when
committed in the online environment and in co-operation with others engaging in
those activities. The definitions of the activities correspond to existing
criminal law provisions.[vi]
The proposal would also aim to safeguard freedom of expression with exemptions
concerning 1) criticism that is directed at a person’s activities in politics
or other public activity, and 2) public debate in matters of general
importance, likewise modelled after existing law.[vii]
Criminal
offences should be clearly and precisely defined in law (“prescribed in law”;
Article 10(2) ECHR). While the first proposal falls considerably
short of this ideal and would not draw a clear line between legal and illegal
conduct, Illman’s proposal would sidestep the problems of vagueness and
over-restrictiveness in relation to freedom of expression.
However, Illman’s
proposal would also have only limited effect in frustrating targeted
harassment, as it does not criminalize much – if anything – that is not already
covered by existing criminal law. Instead, it contains additional elements
(compared to existing provisions) that need to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, which might even decrease conviction rates. The provision would therefore
provide little value beyond sending a symbolic message. As Illman himself
concedes in his report, the provision would therefore be unnecessary.[viii]
Of course, there are many alternative approaches to drafting a provision on maalittaminen beyond the ones discussed above. As a side note, a further possible criminal law section on maalittaminen was even the subject of a question in the 2021 entrance exam to Finnish law schools.[ix]
"Cybermobbing" in the Austrian Criminal Code
Meanwhile, if we examine the Criminal Code of Austria, we find an existing provision that could be applicable to maalittaminen. Section (§) 107c of the Austrian Criminal Code (“Strafgesetzbuch”; StGB) states the following:
"Any person who, by means of telecommunications or using a computer system, in a manner likely to unreasonably interfere with a person in the conduct of his or her life,shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding 720 day rates.”[x]
Jakob Zanol |
This provision addresses a single perpetrator (“any person”) but could also apply to every member of a group attacking a single target. This means that it could theoretically provide a suitable deterrent against many forms of maalittaminen, in particular against actions by the initiators of harassment.Unlike present Finnish provisions, this provision is specific to the online environment. However, this alone does not guarantee that it would be applicable to each individual act that takes place within the context of an online harassment campaign.
Conclusion and outlook
The Austrian approach
embodied in the cybermobbing provision might be useful in addressing maalittaminen
in Finland, as well. However, we should not forget that any new criminal
provision can bring about unintended side effects. A provision similar to the
Austrian one could, if applied extensively, lead to a severe restriction of
free speech. This risk exists especially in the context of criticism of persons
of public interest, such as politicians, whose position as public servants
opens them to legitimate criticism according to the ECtHR.[xi]
Notably, the European
Commission recently proposed a new directive on combating violence against
women and domestic violence,[xii]
which would obligate the member states to criminalize cyber stalking, cyber harassment and cyber incitement to violence or hatred. In the proposal, cyber
harassment is defined in terms similar to the Finnish understanding of maalittaminen.
Should this directive
be adopted, Finnish legislators (as well as the authors) would have to
re-evaluate the need to complement existing criminal law with a new criminal
offence. However, the national implementation of the directive would still
require addressing the challenges identified above: the requirement of
precision connected with the principle of legality, and the balancing of
different constitutional rights.
In addition to criminal law and the criminal justice system, we should consider other approaches, such as platform regulation. By this, we do not mean only intermediary liability for illegal content, but also regulation based on more modern governance and regulatory paradigms. Such include, for instance, focus on service design and proactive duties, digital constitutionalism, and human rights-based approach to content moderation.[xiii]
Fig 2. Some possible responses to problems related to online harassment.
There is usually no single, quick solution to complex problem fields such as online harassment. Therefore, we should explore different kinds of solutions, and identify the best possible combination of regulatory (and even non-regulatory) means and measures. As many problems related to online harassment are global or universal, comparison of solutions adopted in different jurisdictions can continue to play a role in this search.
[i] This post is based on Juhana Riekkinen’s paper Targeting Targeted Harassment: Problems with Criminalization and Platform Liability presented at Internationales Rechtsinformatik Symposion IRIS 2022, and the discussions during and following the conference session, which was chaired by Jakob Zanol. The original paper has been published in the Conference proceedings (Schweighofer, Erich – Saarenpää, Ahti – Eder, Stefan – Zanol, Jakob – Schmautzer, Felix – Kummer, Franz – Hanke, Philip (eds.), Recht DIGITAL – 25 Jahre IRIS: Tagungsband des 25. Internationalen Rechtsinformatik Symposions IRIS 2022 / Proceedings of the 25th International Legal Informatics Symposium IRIS 2022, Editions Weblaw, Bern 2022, 383–392) and in Jusletter IT at https://jusletter-it.weblaw.ch/issues/2022/30-Juni-2022/targeting-targeted-h_2071282917.html. Presentation slides are available at https://easychair.org/smart-slide/slide/Hl5J#.
[ii] This could be translated
as targeted harassment. Kristiina
Koivukari and Päivi Korpisaari have opted for the translation online shaming (Online shaming – a New
Challenge for Criminal Justice. In: Bayer, Judit – Holznagel, Bernd – Korpisaari,
Päivi – Woods, Lorna (eds.), Perspectives on Platform Regulation: Concepts and
Models of Social Media Governance Across the Globe, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2021,
473–487). Related but not identical concepts include cyberbullying, cybermobbing,
cyberstalking, doxing, trolling and flaming.
[iii] National Police Board etc., Lainsäädännölliset
muutostarpeet viranomaisten maalittamiseen puuttumiseksi, Initiative to the
Ministry of Justice, ID-19121964, POL-2018-54628, 17 June 2019.
[iv] Beyond this, the proposal does not
address any cyber-specific features of maalittaminen, and it would not
be limited to online harassment.
[v] Illman, Mika, Järjestelmällinen häirintä
ja maalittaminen: Lainsäädännön arviointia, Valtioneuvoston kanslia, Helsinki
2020. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2020120399312.
[vi] These offences are currently
regulated in chapter 25, section 7 (menace), chapter 24, sections 9
(defamation) and 8 (dissemination of information violating personal privacy)
and chapter 17, section 1 (public incitement to an offence) of the Criminal
Code. An unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code is available at https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039_20150766.pdf.
[vii] Current provisions on defamation and
dissemination of information violating personal privacy contain similar
exemptions. Only expressions that do not clearly exceed what can be deemed acceptable
are exempted. Thus, the clauses do not mean that freedom of expression would be
absolute even in the context of important societal debate or political
criticism, but they obligate the courts to engage in a balancing act between
different (fundamental) rights at stake. The Supreme Court of Finland has
stated that such balancing may be required in certain situations even when the
criminal provision in question does not contain explicit exemptions (KKO
2022:8). In this case, online behaviour that can be considered a form of maalittaminen
was evaluated as stalking (chapter 25, section 7a of the Criminal Code).
[viii] Illman 2020, 137–140.
[ix] The candidates
were asked to evaluate a fictional government proposition for a new criminal
code section on maalittaminen from
the perspective of criminalization principles. https://oikeustieteet.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Valintakoe_oikeustiede_2021.pdf.
[x] This is not an
official translation; highlights added by the authors.
[xi] ECtHR Castells v. Spain (1992). No.
11798/85, § 46, A236; Incal v. Turkey (1998). No. 22678/93, § 54, ECHR 1998 IV;
Tammer v. Estonia (2001). No. 41205/98, § 62, ECHR 2001-I.
[xii] COM(2022) 105 final. Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence
against women and domestic violence. Strasbourg, 8.3.2022.
[xiii] See Riekkinen
2022, 388–391.
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