2025/02/10

A circular economy approach can enhance the EU’s domestic capacities in transition minerals (but it takes time)

Authors:

Andrei Diaconescu (doctoral researcher)

Emilia Taimi (doctoral researcher)

Sirja-Leena Penttinen (associate professor)

Jouko Nuottila (postdoctoral researcher)

What are transition minerals and what is all the fuss about them?

To start 2025 with a bang, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, expressed his interest over Greenland – an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark – sending shock waves through the European Union (EU). President Trump’s interest in Greenland is primarily considered to relate to national security and the geopolitical importance of the territory in the Arctic, but also to resource acquisition: as ice melts due to global warming, resources become more accessible (Paddison 2025). Greenland possesses vast natural resources, including rare earth minerals and other transition minerals critical to powering the digital and green energy transitions. In February 2025, President Trump linked the continuation of the US war support for Ukraine to a ‘transactional approach’, proposing a supply of critical and rare earth minerals such as lithium, uranium, and titanium from Ukraine’s bedrock to the US in return (Méheut 2025).

The recent turmoil surrounding Greenland and Ukraine highlights the crucial importance of transition minerals to nations. These minerals, often referred to as critical minerals in countries reliant on their supply, encompass a broad range of essential materials used in various high-tech and clean energy applications (International Energy Agency 2021). They are vital for the shift from fossil fuels to greener alternatives. For instance, the mainstreaming battery technology used in electric vehicles (EVs), the lithium-ion, requires a variety of minerals, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, manganese, and rare earths. With the adoption of ambitious global decarbonization agendas, EVs have emerged as the predominant ‘green’ technology in the transport sector. Consequently, the demand for these minerals is skyrocketing (International Energy Agency 2024). In addition to clean tech, these minerals are central to the national defense and aerospace industries, which further explains countries’ sensitivities and strategic rivalries concerning these minerals.

The problem with transition minerals is that some have them, others don’t. The current known and deployed reserves of key minerals are found in specific regions: lithium in Australia, Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina; nickel in Indonesia and Russia; cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (natural) graphite in China, the latter also having significant dominance in the ore refining capacity. The geographical concentration of each node in the transition mineral supply chain has highlighted supply chain concerns, particularly among major consuming countries. As supply chain disruptions can have significant economic, political, and security implications, many jurisdictions have adopted a wide range of measures to increase supply chain resilience (Penttinen and Burlinghaus 2025).

In response to the increasing demand and the need to mitigate dependency arising from the geological concentration, new reserves are actively being explored – including the exploration for resources in space, the deep-sea bed and the Arctic region. In addition to discovering new resources, active measures have been adopted to integrate the circular economy approach to key transition minerals in the EU, which provides a secondary supply route for these materials critical for decarbonization technologies. This approach enhances the EU’s domestic capacities and, consequently, its security of supply.

What is meant by the circular economy of transition minerals?

In simple terms, the circular economy of transition minerals involves reusing and recycling products that contain these valuable raw materials, as well as the minerals themselves. In practice this requires a novel perspective towards the end-of-life of primary products (Commission 2020). This circular way of thinking and moving away from the linear take-make-waste mentality provides both challenges and possibilities for business and regulation. As virgin transition minerals are scattered globally, and their extraction creates geopolitical, environmental and societal strains, a circular approach has gained increasing attention. When reliance on virgin materials is diminished through a circular economy, it also mitigates risks related to price volatility and security of supply (United Nations 2024; Elobeid 2022).

In the battery context, a circular economy approach refers to a system where end-of-life batteries, their components, and materials are reused, repurposed, or recycled into new batteries. EV batteries, for example, can get a new life in stationary energy storage systems (Rufino Junior et al. 2024). The EU has adopted a new Batteries Regulation specifically addressing battery circularity (Regulation 2023). The main objective of the Regulation is to ensure that used batteries are collected, reused and recycled efficiently in the EU. This will be achieved through gradually tightening targets from 2025 onwards. For example, the recycling efficiency of lithium-based batteries should be 65 % by the end of 2025, increasing to 70 % by the end of 2030. Similarly, targets for the recovery of materials have been set, ranging from 50% for lithium to 90% for cobalt, nickel, copper and lead. 

The shift towards the circular economy for batteries is impeded by the pragmatic reality that initiating their second lifecycle requires a significant amount of time. As the transition from combustion fuel engines to electric vehicles using batteries is still ongoing, the products need first to go through their primary use before material for reuse and recycling can be provided.

Digital traceability tools to facilitate the uptake of the circular economy

To facilitate the circular economy of end-of-life batteries, the EU has enacted the ‘battery passport’, initially introduced by the Global Battery Alliance. The battery passport is an electronic record that enables traceability for the reuse and recycling of the raw materials used in batteries (Council 2023). The battery passport will apply to certain types of batteries placed on the market or put into service as of February 2027, namely to EV batteries, light means of transport batteries such as electric bikes and scooters, and industrial batteries with a capacity greater than 2kWh (Article 77 and preamble para. 15 of the Regulation 2023).

The battery passport enables informed decision-making based on reliable information to stakeholders in the entire supply chain (Global Battery Alliance 2024). The battery passport will contain information such as the battery’s capacity, chemistry and composition, critical raw materials present in the battery, hazardous substances and carbon footprint of battery production’s process, to be accessed digitally through a quick response (QR) code (Regulation 2023).

The QR code will provide public access to information about the battery’s material composition and chemistry, with sensitive commercial details like performance and durability restricted to those with legitimate interest (Article 77(2)(a, c) and Annex XIII, point 1 and 4 of the Regulation 2023). It will also disclose the percentage of recycled content used in a battery, strengthening the circular economy by enabling the evaluation of a battery’s residual value or remaining lifetime, facilitating its further use (preamble 124 of the Regulation 2023). The passport will also include information on responsible sourcing through environmental, social and governance due diligence (Annex XIII 1(d) of the Regulation 2023), aiding in the management and collection of waste batteries and preventing the inappropriate disposal of harmful substances and enforce caps on hazardous materials as enshrined in the Batteries Regulation. 

Opportunities for Finland

In recent years, Finland’s wind power production capacity has consistently set new records almost annually. Although the expansion of renewable energy production capacity, particularly wind energy, has contributed to maintaining relatively low electricity prices in Finland – positioning it as the EU Member State with the second lowest electricity prices – price volatility remains significant (Finnish Energy Industries).

To address the challenges posed by the high volatility of wind energy production, one viable solution involves the implementation of various energy storage systems. These systems can temporarily store electricity during peak production periods (Jarbratt et al. 2023). Energy storage facilities help to balance the grid while reducing price fluctuations.

While there are several energy storage technologies, one of the most promising is using second-hand EV batteries for stationary energy storage systems (Allen 2022), preferably located close to the production site. While an EV battery must be replaced in its original installation after the maximum recharge capacity has decreased under a predefined limit (capacity loss will happen after certain amount of charge cycles), the replaced batteries can have prolonged use of many years for secondary, less intensive, use cases such as providing energy storage capacity.

Finland is in a good position to become one of the technology leaders in battery-related circular economy applications. Finnish research institutes have pioneering research activities in areas such as battery chemistry and the implementation of the battery passport (discussed above). Finnish companies and start-ups are also actively investing in new business opportunities related to the battery ecosystem. However, the advent of new technologies also introduces uncertainties. For example, access to second-hand batteries might be limited (Laakso 2024), and the regulation of liabilities associated with their deployment might be problematic (Ouro-Nimini 2023; Rufino Junior et al. 2024).

A circular economy approach can enhance the EU’s capabilities in securing not only domestic raw materials but also strategic products, such as batteries, by promoting reuse. Additionally, digital traceability tools facilitate this process by providing crucial information on various metrics of used raw materials and products. However, a circular economy approach requires time to be effectively integrated into the value chain – the critical question amidst ongoing (geo)political upheavals and a warming climate is, however, do we have enough time?


***

The authors’ ongoing research at the University of Lapland and the Law, Technology and Sustainability Transitions Research Group (LOST) centers on transition minerals, EV batteries’ supply chain, and the implementation of a circular economy approach. Under the 2IMATCH consortium, funded by the Strategic Research Council of Finland, the research undertaken at the University of Lapland examines the new regulations and policies adopted in the EU to ensure resilience of transition minerals’ supply chain in the context of evolving (energy) geopolitics. The BATRACE project, funded by the Research Council of Finland, focuses on the EV battery supply chain. It examines emerging national, regional and international regulatory frameworks and aims to identify the best practices for developing a transnational framework that supports the security and sustainability of the battery supply chain. The AKILIT project, funded by the European Union’s Regional Development Fund, focuses on new circular value chains, business models, technologies, and regulations related to the reuse and recycling of batteries. Together with local companies and innovation accelerators, the project aims to develop the circular economy of batteries in Northern Finland and identify the best business opportunities from the perspective of regional growth, employment, and green transition.


Sources:

Allen 2022. ‘Finnish startup Cactos raises €2.5 million to tackle the energy crisis with second-life Tesla batteries’ (November 29, 2022, EU-Startups); https://www.eu-startups.com/2022/11/finnish-startup-cactos-raises-e2-5-million-to-tackle-the-energy-crisis-with-second-life-tesla-batteries/

Commission 2020. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A new Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe, COM(2020)98 final.

Council 2023. Council of the European Union, ‘Towards a sustainable, circular, European battery supply chain’ (December 8, 2023) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/battery-supply-chain/>.

Elobeid 2022. ‘How the circular economy can help us stay within planetary boundaries’. (August, 31, 2022, Ellen MacArthur Foundation); https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/articles/how-the-circular-economy-can-help-us-stay-within-planetary-boundaries

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