Interests and values – a “new” neo-functionalist European Union foreign and security policy

Author: Markku Kiikeri (Lecturer in European Law)

Research Group: Law, Markets and the Environment

The text has previously been published in Finnish in Perustuslakiblogi.

Traditionally, neo-functionalism has been seen very much only as an integration theory explaining the functioning of the EU's internal market. In contrast to theories explaining the international relations of states (rule-centered Kantian idealism and classical realism (Morgenthau)), in neo-functionalism (Haas) all social actors, from the individual to the state (companies, municipalities, administration, political organs, etc.), operate more freely according to their own goals and values and in a system that places less emphasis on regulation. Everyone's actions affect the actions of others. This creates internal integration but also wealth and benefits for the entire system.

The “Leavers” of Brexit did not understand this at the time – and perhaps do not understand it even today. The reintroduction of a sovereign-centered regulatory system into the UK dismantled the neo-functionalist, integrative features of British political and economic thinking. It brought citizens and other social actors back under centralized political and economic control. Activities based on one's own interests and values were cut off in many ways. At the same time, the multipolar setting of common goals and values was increasingly subjected to the control of the British political and economic elite.

Brexit is Brexit. What is new, however, is that now that the crisis in Ukraine is escalating, the European Union's foreign and security policy can also be explained by the theory of neo-functionalism. The restrictive sanctions provided for in Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and other foreign policy, can in many ways be seen as a practical form of foreign policy integration based on the interests and values of all Union individual actors. Whether we are talking about humanitarian aid, the exercising of economic activity (in Russia, perhaps also in China), aid to refugees, military aid, arms transfers, etc., foreign policy integration is deepening within the framework of each sector. Furthermore, it is based on each actor's own interests and values.

Another common basis is interaction. Criticism of and cross-border societal debate on policies is diversifying and networking. Each type of production or trade is the result of the interests and values of the producer. At the same time, however, the decision to continue such production or trade in a country such as Russia, as revealed to the citizens by the internationalizing media, is subject to a cross-border political debate on basic values. Citizens' value-based consumption habits are shaped now by the “foreign policy” considerations of an individual consumer.

The autonomous decisions of states per se may differ according to their own objectives and circumstances. Meanwhile, the European social values debate can assess the interests and values of that country's activities and create political pressure. International restrictive measures are carried out in different ways by different countries, regions and individuals, but they influence other countries and Europe as a whole. This directly affects the value-based debate in an unprecedented way. Borders are breaking once again.

This is how the European Union develops, in the words of the old phrase, in small steps and through crises. So, now it is time for different types of analysis of EU foreign and security policy. Where it all leads, we shall wait and see.

This idea could follow the concept of “strategic autonomy” (Flott). According to that concept, European security cooperation can be developed through the operations of states independent especially in relation to the United States (“separate levels of defense cooperation”): the more European cooperation without dependence on the United States, the more strategic autonomy.

Regardless of such autonomy, however, it is safe to say that neo-functionalist dynamics have now returned, but in a new form.